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COMMENT
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND INSIDER
TRADING: AYN RAND MEETS THE
THEORY OF THE FIRM
JONATHAN R. MACEY*
INTRODUCTION
The practice of insider trading has been met with excoriation
by members of the legal community, who view it as a paradig-
matic case of the unethical abuse of power by corporate officers
and directors. Those of us who pray for a less impassioned and
more focused treatment of the subject have ridiculed the shal-
lowness and the moral fervor of the majority, who Mr. Lawson
in his article The Ethics ofInsider Trading describes succinctly as
"foot-stampers."1
...
It has long been thought that one way to focus the insider
trading debate in a more constructive way would be for a seri-
ous scholar to treat the ethical dimensions of the subject in a
meaningful way. Such a treatment would bring the issues into
sharper focus and quell the empty emotionalism that appears
to drive the current debate. Unfortunately, insider trading is a
surprisingly difficult subject area within the realm of corporate
law, and ethical philosophy is not the simplest field of study
either. Combining the two, which was Mr. Lawson's task, is an
extremely ambitious undertaking. As Mr. Lawson points out,
he is the first even to make the attempt. For this he is to be
congratulated. But what Lawson has shown here, I think, is the
close relationship between ethics and economics to any analysis
of insider trading. His failure to come to terms with the ethical
implications of the impressive economic literature on insider
trading is a deep flaw in his effort.
Economists, and those interested in law and economics, have
made great strides in applying economic principles to the legal
• Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am grateful for the comments and sugges-
tions ofGregory S. Alexander, David B. Lyons, Dale A. Oesterle, Roberta Romano and
Steven S. Shiffrin.
1. Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, II HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 727, 775-83
(1988).
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issues that surround insiders' trading activity.2 Much of their
work addresses the question ofwhether insider trading hurts or
harms firms, shareholders, markets, or economies. Thus in a
very real sense, the utilitarian aspect of the ethics of insider
trading already have been exhaustively canvassed. As I will ex-
plain later, in my view the attempt to critique insider trading
using ethical philosophy-d.ivorced from economic analysis-is
something of a non-starter, because ethical theory does not
have much to add to the work that has already been done by
economists.
Thus, in some sense, I suppose Mr. Lawson has given us
about all we can expect from a writer on this subject-an inter-
esting and provocative essay. Unfortunately, what is interesting
and provocative about his essay has less to do with the specifics
of insider trading than with such larger questions as whether
the concepts of private property can be legitimated. While eth-
ical theory has a lot to say about the legitimacy of private prop-
erty, it is not entirely clear that the debate among philosophers
differs from the debate among economists, except in the vocab-
ulary used by the respective disciplines. Indeed, Mr. Lawson's
article is strongest when it confirms the conclusions of econo-
mists. In those areas where Mr. Lawson's arguments find them-
selves in real or imagined conflict with economic efficiency
notions, his ethical theory becomes obscure.
Mr. Lawson is amazingly kind in his treatment of the many
earlier writers who ignore economic theory and decry insider
trading on the simple basis that "it's just not right." He claims
that it is not fair to criticize such people for these sorts ofasser-
tions because constructing fully developed, internally coherent
moral theories is not easy to do, and proving such theories may
well be impossible. On this basis Mr. Lawson rather patroniz-
ingly declares that until greater minds offer the current genera-
2. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Carlton &
Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Carney, Signalling
and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. V.L. REV. 863 (1987); Dooley, Enforcement of
Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret
Agents Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production ofInfonnation, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309; Ma-
cey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction ofthe Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 9 (1984); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV.
547 (1970); Ross, The Determination ofFinancial Stucture: The Incentive-Signalling Approach,
8 BELL]. Econ. 23 (1977); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Pri-
vacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980); Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market
Efficiency, 16]. FIN. ECON. 189 (1986).
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tion of theoreticians something more helpful, it is unfair to
criticize the embarrassingly bad quality of the existing scholar-
ship on the ethics of insider trading.
Mr. Lawson's gentle treatment of the foot-stampers is unwar-
ranted. The current scholarship that decries insider trading as
"unfair" completely lacks reasoned argument. Often those who
brand insider trading as unfair do not even attempt to explain
what insider trading is, much less why it is unfair. Mr. Lawson
strives to bring the debate out of its current antediluvian state
by organizing a useful taxonomy that describes the core prem-
ises of those who are railing against insider trading. Using this
taxonomy, Mr. Lawson finds three distinct sets of moral objec-
tions to insider trading. Unfortunately, he too fails to provide a
precise definition of the term "insider trading," and this short-
coming severely limits the usefulness of his taxonomy.
The kindness shown by Mr. Lawson to the moral apologists
for insider trading rules reflects a deeper flaw in the article.
Most of the scholarship that attempts to label insider trading as
unethical is based simply upon ideology, not ethical philoso-
phy. Mr. Lawson does not adequately recognize the distinction
between ethical theory and ideology, and as a result often con-
fuses the two. His proposed organizational framework itself re-
lies upon the ideology of Ayn Rand to classify all theories as
either "altruistic" or "egoist." The influence of Ms. Rand's
teachings upon Mr. Lawson's analysis makes it difficult to un-
derstand what, if anything, his article has to offer for those who
do not share his faith in her belief system.
Another shortcoming in Mr. Lawson's article is that it as-
sumes, without any explanation whatsoever, that there is, or' at
least may be, a conflict between the outcomes generated by an
analysis of insider trading based on natural rights and an analy-
sis based on efficiency notions. This faulty assumption results
in needless quibbling between Mr. Lawson and writers in the
law and economics movement whose work precedes his own.
Finally, Mr. Lawson's effort to clarify the ethical dimension of
the insider trading issue suffers from not recognizing the basic
economic principles that underlie many of the concerns about
insider trading. As a result, he fails to address some of the
stronger justifications for the arguments he condemns.
The remainder of this Comment explores each of the short-
comings I have identified and discusses why moral theory is un-
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likely to offer much hope for resolving the issue ofwhether, not
to mention how, to regulate insider trading. As I have argued
elsewhere, the phenomenon of insider trading is simply an-
other instance, and not even a particularly special case, of the
larger set of issues that fall under the general heading topic of
property rights in information.3 While ethical theory has much
to say about property rights, it is really the wrong tool to use
on the problem of insider trading, since there is nothing special
about the ethics of insider trading. Ethical questions regarding
how to allocate the rights to use valuable corporate information
simply do not differ from ethical questions regarding how to
allocate the rights to other assets.
I. ETHICS VS. IDEOLOGY IN THE DEBATE
AGAINST INSIDER TRADING
It is not difficult to confuse ethical judgments with ideologi-
cal beliefs. Indeed, in close cases the distinction is quite subtle.
At the extremes, however, the analysis is easy. Ethics has to do
with the establishment of individual, moral standards of con-
duct. The goal of ethical theory is to arrive at clearly delineated
moral standards from carefully constructed premises, which
themselves are subject to justificatory critique.4 Ideology, on
the other hand, is merely a descriptive term for the prejudices
of a particular class or group that are reflected in their doc-
trines and opinions. While ethical theory starts from the bot-
tom and seeks to construct a set of principles from first
premises, ideology starts at the top with its conclusions and
proceeds downward to justify these results on sociological,5
cultural,6 psychologicaI,7 or epistemological8 grounds. While
3. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction ofthe Rules Against Insider Trading,
13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984).
4. D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAw 11-35 (1984).
5. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were the initial proponents of this approach.
6. Examples of the cultural, sometimes called "psychocultural," approaches to ideol-
ogy are contained in the work of Clifford Geertz and Leon Dion:
Our hypothesis is that political ideology is a cultural and mental complex
which mediates between the norms associated with given social attitudes and
conduct and the norms which the political institutions and mechanisms tend
to crystallize and propagate. In other terms, political ideology is a more or less
integrated system of values and norms, rooted in society, which individuals
and groups project on the political plane in order to promote the aspirations
and ideals they have come to value in social life.
Dion, Political Ideology as a Tool ofFunctional Analysis in Socio-Political Dynamics: An Hypothe-
sis, 25 CANADIAN J. ECON. POL. SCI. 47, 49 (1959); see also Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural
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ethical theory seeks to ground moral judgments on carefully
constructed logical hypotheses, "[i]deology is an emotion-
laden, myth-saturated, action-related system of beliefs and val-
ues about man and society, legitimacy and authority, acquired
as a matter of routine and habitual reinforcement."9
Mr. Lawson fails to recognize that when commentators such
as William Painter, Louis Loss, and Ralph Nader decry any and
all forms of insider trading, they are not advancing any theory
at all, much less an ethical theory. Rather, they are condemning
insider trading on the basis that it is antithetical to a set of cul-
tural norms that were acquired through routine and habitual
reinforcement, and therefore are nothing more than ideologi-
cally-based belief systems. Professor Painter is particularly hon-
est about the origins of his beliefs regarding insider trading.
He scoffs at moral philosophy,IO choosing instead to ground
his arguments purely in emotional terms. II Indeed, in a tri-
umph ofanti-intellectual sophistry over reasoning and analysis,
he defends arguments against insider trading on the grounds
that they contain elements of "simplicity and immediacy which
make up for their lack of theoretical respectability"! 12
Far from objecting to such anti-intellectualism, Mr. Lawson
actually refers to such ramblings as "fair" questions with which
all "legal scholarship must, at some point, come to gripS."13
Because the vast majority of Mr. Lawson's essay is a critique of
the existing moral notions about insider trading, he ultimately
ends up doing more to legitimize these empty ideas than to
expand our understanding of insider trading.
System, in IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 47 (D. Apter ed. 1964) (examining the cultural
elements embodied in ideology).
7. Needless to say, the leading proponent of the psychological approach to ideology
was Freud, who expounded the view that ideological is "essential to man's psychologi-
cal well-being as well as to the continuity ofculture," Rejai, Ideowgy, in 2 DICTIONARY OF
THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 552, 557 (1973).
8. Etienne Bonnet de Condillac is "widely acknowledged as the founder of [this]
school of ideology:' See id. at 553.
9. Id. at 558. See also R. GUESS, THE IDEA OF A CRmCAL THEORY 4-12 (1981).
10. But, after all, what is morality? Attempts to provide a "rational" foundation
for moral judgments have a way ofbeing unconvincing. The whole philosophy
ofethicaljudgments has a pedantic quality which escapes the ordinary individ-
ual who merely stamps his, or her foot and declares, inarticulately that "I
don't care, it's just not right:'
Painter, Book Review, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 146, 159 (1966).
11. "Even if the content ofmoral statements be primarily emotive, which is doubtful,
a satisfactory morality must be emotionally satisfying ...." Id.
12. Id. at 159.
13. Lawson, supra note 1, at 775, 776.
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Mr. Lawson thus appears to have exceedingly low standards
for what constitutes ethical theory. It is therefore not surprising
that he weaves his ideas rather confusingly throughout a dis-
cussion of the writings of others instead of expressing his own
ideas about the ethics of insider trading in any systematic
fashion.
Taken as a whole, what emerges from Mr. Lawson's effort is
an analysis, albeit a highly inconclusive one, based on classical
egoism, which he summarizes in a sub-section titled "An Egois-
tic Interlude."14 Egoism is the belief, which Mr. Lawson traces
back to the classical Greek tradition of eudaimonism, that the
individual's highest moral calling is to himself. I5 In essence, it
seems, the egoist's moral calling in life is to "identify that
human excellence that is distinctively his own-that is, his dai-
mon-and the principles of conduct that will allow him to de-
velop that excellence and flourish as a person."16
Unfortunately, of course, because "each person has unique po-
tentialities that, in the particular circumstances in which he
finds himself, ought to be actualized if he is to flourish as a
person,"17 it is not possible to construct any universally appli-
cable principles of moral conduct. Thus, to mention but a few,
Aristotle and Hegel are out, and Kant and Hume obviously are
out also. Locke should be out too, but for some reason he is
not. IS
Mr. Lawson's idea is that most of the criticisms of insider
trading are, in the final analysis, grounded on notions of altru-
ism and are therefore unacceptable. Mr. Lawson finds it impor-
tant to rehabilitate egoism because of the lack of good
argument in favor of altruism. 19 This line of reasoning has two
14. Id. at 747. At one point Mr. Lawson includes a Lockean theory ofinsider trading,
which I discuss in the following section. See id. at 763-69. Because Mr. Lawson believes
that "something like a Lockean ... approach flows from eudaimonism [classical ego-
ism]," id. at 768, little is lost by not treating his Lockean arguments here.
15. Id. at 748.
Because of the highly individualistic nature of egoism, this belief system does not
provide an acceptable basis for actually solving moral problems. The reason is that
such problems characteristically involve conflicts of interest; the moral problem is to
provide a fair solution. Imagine a judge deciding a case in a particular way on the
ground that the outcome promotes her (thejudge's) best interestl Egoism can be saved
from irrelevancy only ifit can be shown to require acts and decisions that involve a due
concern for others. I am grateful to David Lyons for this point.
16. Id. at 748.
17. Id. at 749.
18. See infra notes 30-46 (discussing application of Locke's work to insider trading).
19. Lawson, supra note 1 at 747.
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flaws that relate specifically to the insider trading debate.
First, as Mr. Lawson himself at times seems to recognize,
there may not be a conflict between egoism and altruism.20
Egoism at least pretends to concern itself with individual flour-
ishing, not simply short-term wish fulfillment at the expense of
others. To say that someone is an egoist does not necessarily
mean that he is not altruistic, particularly if altruism is the
means through which he best can flourish. Indeed if one's
"unique potentialities" are altruistic in nature, then the tenets
of egoism and altruism would dictate the same conduct.
Second, and perhaps more importandy, it is not clear pre-
cisely what egoistic theory implies for insider trading besides a
seemingly absurd result. Ifwe take Mr. Lawson's suggestion se-
riously and look at the insider trading controversy by invoking
an egoistic ethic, the analysis becomes virtually comic. Mr. Law-
son appears to say that the egoist who finds himself in posses-
sion of material, non-public information about a particular firm
must decide whether trading on the basis of that information is
"self-fulfilling," that is, whether it "will allow him to develop
... and flourish as a person."21 Mr. Lawson defends this posi-
tion against the straw-man argument that self-fulfillment is a
better guide to human action than peer pressure. The more dif-
ficult question is whether self-fulfillment is a better guide to
human action than one's own sense of individual duty and
moral responsibility.
Frankly, the unrefined argument that acquiring money is
good is not really worthy of discussion, because all sides- yes,
even the egoists-agree that there is a significant difference be-
tween making money in some wealth-creating activity like in-
vestment or entrepreneurship and making money by stealing
it.22 The only moral (or economic) question worth asking is
where insider trading lies along the continuum that runs from
wealth creation to theft. Mr. Lawson does nothing to help us
sort this out. Similarly, Mr. Lawson explains that refraining
from insider trading might be a good idea ifone has agreed not
to engage in insider trading prior to disclosure, or if failure to
disclose prior to trading would "seriously damage someone of
20. Id. at 751-52.
21. See id. at 748.
22. See id. at 762 (The statement that 'Theft is wrong" is "as close to an uncon-
troversial moral proposition as one is going to get").
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great [objective] importance to him."23 But these are precisely
the situations that those of us who have been engaged in the
study of insider trading have been studying. What constitutes
an "agreement" not to engage in insider trading? Is such an
argument an implicit part of every manager's employment
agreement? And if it isn't, why not?
The freedom given to corporate officers and directors as a
manifestation of the separation of ownership and management
in the large, publicly held corporation, makes contractarian
analysis of insider trading issues very difficult.24 Reasonable
people, who agree on a wide range of corporate law matters,
divide on the seemingly intractable issue of how to allocate the
privilege to trade on material, non-public information.25
As Mr. Lawson himself appears to suggest at various points
in his article,26 "[t]he moral inquiry with respect to insider
stock trading thus centers on where the network of contracts
between the firm and its shareholders, suppliers, lawyers, ac-
countants, investment bankers, printers, and so on, places the
right to trade on the information."27 This is a point that has
been made both implicitly and explicitly by many, including
myself.28 But it is not at all obvious what this inquiry has to do
with egoism-or with altruism for that matter.29
To take a very simple example of the difficulty of determin-
ing whether a particular corporate act is consistent with ethical
norms, suppose we observe a Harvard law student leaving
Langdell Hall late one snowy evening. Shrouded beneath his
parka is an electric typewriter that belongs to the law school. Is
the student doing anything wrong in removing this typewriter?
The answer depends on whether someone with legitimate au-
thority (that is, the owner of the typewriter or his agent) has
given the student permission to take the machine. The analysis
23. Id. at 752.
24. Frank Easterbrook has been particularly alert to this problem. See Easterbrook,
Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSI-
NESS 81-98 (Pratt & Zeckhauser eds. 1985).
25. Compare Easterbrook, supra notes 2 and 24, with Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2.
26. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 1, at 767-73.
27. Id. at 766.
28. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2; Haddock & Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider
Trading, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1449 (1986); Macey, supra note 2.
29. Mr. Lawson tells us that the contractarian approach to insider trading finds its
intellectual roots in Locke. See Lawson, supra note 1, at 769. Having said this, he then
asserts that "something like a Lockean approach flows from eudaimonism [classical
egoism]." But he declines to tell us how or why this connection is made.
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is the same for traders who use inside information. In the first
step of the analysis we invoke Locke to determine who has le-
gitimate ownership rights over the relevant information. If it is
the person trading in the information, there is no ethical prob-
lem whatsoever: We are simply observing a person making
proper use of his assets. So, for example, there is no ethical
issue when a tender offeror purchases stock in a target com-
pany before disclosing his plans to the target's shareholders.
The tender offeror, as the creator of the news that there will be
a tender offer, is the rightful owner, according to a Lockean
analysis, of this information.30 The problem arises when the
person trading on the information is not its rightful owner. In
such a case, we must first determine whether the trader has the
actual or implied authority of the owner to use the information
before we can know whether or not his actions are ethically jus-
tified. Thus, as is explored more fully below, the dichotomy be-
tween efficiency principles and the ethical norms implied by
natural rights analysis is a false one.
II. NATURAL RIGHTS VS. EFFICIENCY
In an earlier article I argued that inside information was an
economic asset not unlike other intangible assets such as pat-
ents and trade secrets.31 I argued that Locke's work could pro-
vide the analytical framework under which the property rights
in material, nonpublic corporate information could be allo-
cated. The basis for invoking Locke was my belief that applying
his theory for allocating property rights would lead to an effi-
cient system of legal rules that maximized social welfare. A
Lockean allocation of property rights in inside information
maximizes societal welfare, in my view, because it lowers the
costs of doing business for certain firms, thus benefitting share-
holders,32 and also because it creates incentives for individuals
and firms to use resources efficiently.33
Mr. Lawson does not like my efficiency-based approach to
Locke. He claims that even though the analysis reaches conclu-
30. Macey, supra note 2, at 28 n.98 ("because a corporation that makes a tender offer
expends great resources to do so, information that a target company is an appropriate
target may be said to exist in a 'state of nature,' to use Locke's analysis").
31. See Macey, supra note 2. As used here, inside information refers to any informa-
tion not already reflected in the price of the firm's stock.
32. See Haddock & Macey, supra note 28.
33. Macey, supra note 2, at 32.
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sions that are quite close to his own, such an approach would,
in effect, deny to the individual the central ethical role in his
own life.34 Mr. Lawson is creating a controversy out of whole
cloth, because he does not analyze whether there is a conflict
between natural rights analysis and the economic goal ofattain-
ing efficiency. Instead, he blithely assumes away the most inter-
esting philosophical question of the entire debate, which
revolves around whether such a conflict exists.
By asserting that if there is a conflict between natural rights
and society's welfare, so much the worse for society's welfare,85
Mr. Lawson saves himself the trouble of having to consider
whether the natural rights basis of the Lockean proviso in fact
differs from the efficiency based approach to property rights
issues. Contrary to Mr. Lawson's unsupported assertion that
the "conceptual difference" between a Lockean approach and
an efficiency-based property rights approach is "enormous,"86
the better argument seems to be that the difference between
the two approaches is non-existent.37
As is well known, it was Locke's view that rightful acquisition
of unowned property (such as material non-public information
about a particular firm) takes place when a person mixes his
labor with the property. There is no controversy at all that this
aspect of Locke's theory of property is consistent with effi-
ciency notions. Wealth is created when human resources are
devoted to improving the natural endowment in such a way
thai others are willing to pay to acquire these improvements.
The willingness to pay leads to mutually consensual transac-
tions that improve the welfare of the contracting parties, and,
ultimately, of society as a whole. Awarding property interests to
those who make such improvements-that is, to those who mix
their labor with unowned property-provides them with the in-
centive to create wealth.
The trouble arises when we consider the so-called "Lockean
Proviso" which appears to limit the acquisition of unowned
34. Lawson, supra note 1, at 751-52.
35. Id. at 770.
36. Id. (claiming that economically based allocations of property rights "are not
Lockean even in the loosest sense of that term").
37. As Geoffrey Miller has pointed out, "the Lockean Proviso ... has a function not
unlike the role of certain efficiency criteria in modern economic thought." Miller, Com-
ment: Economic Efficiency and the Lockean Proviso, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 401, 411
(1987).
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property to those cases in which, after the acquisition, "there is
enough, and as good left in common for others."38 As Geoffrey
Miller has shown in a carefully reasoned essay, however, "[T]he
Lockean proviso is not violated if someone takes [an asset] out
of the commons in excess of his or her pro rata share, so long
as the benefits to others resulting from the excess . . . being
placed in productive use exceed the value of the excess land
which IS taken."39
It is easy to see why there is harmony between the Lockean
Proviso and economic efficiency since market economies re-
quire those who acquire new assets to leave "enough and as
good" for others by payingfor the property. Taking assets out of
the state ofnature is thus consistent with the Lockean Proviso if
doing so makes at least one person better off and no one worse
off than they were before the exchange was made.40 The dan-
ger that Mr. Lawson sees in placing too narrow a focus on eco-
nomic efficiency thus seems misplaced.41
Having considered and rejected Mr. Lawson's warning that
there may be hidden inconsistencies between economic effi-
ciency and Locke's understanding of natural rights, we return
to Mr. Lawson's equally important, but equally unsupported,
declaration that "something like a Lockean ... approach flows
from [classical egoism.]"42 Notwithstanding this assertion,
there are deep inconsistencies between Locke's ideas about the
basis of natural rights and the ideas that Mr. Lawson presents
as classical egoism.
At the outset, it is not clear why an egoist is comfortable with
Locke's notion that one must mix his labor with unowned prop-
erty before claiming it for his own. For the egoist, the only pre-
requisite should be whether acquiring the property would be
necessary or useful for one seeking "to develop ... excellence
and flourish as a person."43 Indeed, because any consideration
of the welfare of others in society is anathema to the egoist, it is
difficult to imagine any justification for placing any restraints
38. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 329 (P. Fras1elt ed. 1698).
39. Miller, supra note 37, at 407.
40. [d. at 410.
41. See Lawson, supra note 1 at 769-71. See also Cohen, A justification ofSocial Welfare
Maximization as a Rights-Based Ethical Theory, 10 HARV.J.L. PuB. POL'y 411 (1987).
42. Lawson, supra note 1, at 768.
43. See id. at 748.
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on an individual's removal of unowned property from a
commons.
Of course, the Lockean Proviso, which constrains those who
would remove property from a commons by forbidding such
removals unless there is "enough and as good left for others,"
presents even more severe problems for the egoist. Why
should the egoist, who cares only about his own self fulfillment,
be concerned with whether there is anything left for others af-
ter his taking?
The gulf between ~r. Lawson's egoism and the conception
of property rights that is shared by Locke and by efficiency
based economists is deeper than even these two examples indi-
cate. At their core, efficiency based justifications of property
rights are based on concerns about social welfare. Indeed the
whole concept of Pareto optimality, which is a fundamental
component of efficiency, is predicated on the idea that, to be
efficient, an economy must allocate resources in such a way that
no change in allocations will make anyone better off without
making another worse off. Unlike the economist or the Lock-
ean, the egoist is decidedly uninterested in a system of social
ordering that contains such decidedly universalist require-
ments. Similarly, the economic abhorrence of waste, which is
shared by moral theorists like Locke,44 has no special place
within the moral framework of the egoist. If being wasteful is
important for a person to "actualize his unique potentialities,"
then waste is O.K.
Finally, contrary to Mr. Lawson's assertions, egoism can not
be reconciled with natural rights analysis for the same reason
that egoism can't be reconciled with any rights theory based on
uniform treatment of moral actors. Namely, the egoistic belief
that it is impossible to specify a precise content for a classical
egoist ethic, because each person has unique potentialities that
ought to be actualized if he is to flourish as a person.45 As such,
it seems to me that any natural rights theory is bound to be
inconsistent with Mr. Lawson's egoism, since such theories are
likely to intrude on someone's notion of self-fulfillment.
At bottom, the Lockean approach and the economic ap-
proach justify themselves on the benefits they hold for society
44. J. LOCKE, supra note 38, at 332, 335-38 (arguing that waste is contrary to the laws
of nature).
45. Lawson, supra note I, at 749.
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as a whole. Adam Smith's invisible hand justifies market
processes on the grounds that such processes guide societal re-
sources to their most highly valued uses, and thereby increase
overall welfare. But, once again, in sharp contrast to egoism, the
justification for private ordering comes from a societal rather
than an individualistic perspective. Similarly, as John Sanders
has pointed out, Locke's theory for allocating property rights
to private individuals is based on the goal of furthering overall
human welfare.46
Thus, it seems to me that Mr. Lawson has it backwards when
he says that there is an analytic gulf between economic theory
and Lockean ideas about property rights, but no such chasm
between the egoistic ethic and the principles of Locke. In fact,
it seems clear that, while Locke's ideas are fully consistent with
Adam Smith (not to mention Chicago-school welfare econom-
ics), there is a strong tension between the ideas of Locke and
the principles of egoism.
III. THE ARGUMENTS THAT LAWSON CONDEMNS
Mr. Lawson finds three sets of moral objections in the litany
ofarguments against insider trading. He addresses these objec-
tions from an egoistic perspective. I will argue that, in those
places that his analysis furthers our understanding of the ethics
of insider trading, it is because it intersects at these particular
junctures with standard economic analysis. Incoherence comes
when his analysis strays from the efficiency criterion familiar to
the economist.
A. Absolute Equality
Into Mr. Lawson's first category fall those who argue that it is
always immoral for a trader to take advantage of an informa-
tional advantage over his trading partner, regardless of how he
obtained the advantage. Mr. Lawson argues that the problem
with the absolute equality argument is that it is based on altru-
ism: Those in possession of information someone else does not •
have must give it to the other person before "taking advan- I
tage" of that person in a market transaction. I disagree. One
46. Sanders, justice and the Initial Acquisition ofProperty, 10 HARV.J.L. PUB. POL'y 367,
398 (1987).
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•
could be an ardent believer in altruism and still reject the idea
of absolute equality among trading partners.
As Mr. Lawson seems to recognize, informational advantages
provide the motivation for important aspects of almost every
transaction in a market economy. Virtually every plumber,
builder, lawyer or doctor who charges for his services is profit-
ing from an informational advantage he enjoys over his trading
partner. To forbid such trading would deprive people of the
incentive to learn the skills necessary to become proficient at
these trades and professions. Similarly, to require stock traders
to disclose any informational advantage to their trading part-
ners would deprive such traders of any incentive to expend the
resources necessary to discover undervalued or overvalued
firms. The discovery of such incorrectly valued assets benefits
traders because they can profit by trading in the underlying
stock. The discovery also benefits society as a whole because it
drives capital to its highest valued uses, thereby increasing soci-
etal wealth.
Altruistic policy-makers, who by definition are desirous of
policies that increase the wealth of others, will want to en-
courage the production ofvaluable information about corpora-
tions in order to improve the operation of the capital markets.
They will do this by permitting people to profit on the informa-
tion they discover. Thus I agree with Mr. Lawson that the ethi-
cal argument in favor of complete informational equality is
non-existent. But the flaw in the fairness-as-equality argument
is not that it relies on altruism, but that it makes investors
worse off than they would be under an alternative arrangement
as a group and therefore cannot be justified on altruistic
grounds.47
B. Equal Access
In an early and influential article, Victor Brudney argued that
the crucial ethical issue in the insider trading debate concerns
the question of unequal access to inside information rather
than unequal possession of inside information.48 His is an in-
47. See Macey & Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U.L.Q,
131 (1987) (arguing that nobody benefits from a rule requiring disclosure of tender
offer information).
48. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Infonnational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
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teresting and important argument that deserves to be taken se-
riously. Much to his credit, Mr. Lawson handles this issue
extremely well, but his response to Professor Brudney is purely
economic. There is not a hint of egoism in it. Mr. Lawson cor-
rectly points out that Judge Easterbrook has gone a long way
towards answering Professor Brudney's equal access argument
by pointing out that access to a particular piece of information
is a function of the cost of obtaining such information.49 In
other words, smarter people or people who have invested re-
sources to develop their human capital in such a way as to bet-
ter assimilate information, or corporate officers and directors
are always going to have superior access to information. As
Judge Easterbrook points out, the resulting inequality of infor-
mation is a consequence of the division of labor and cannot
really be said to be unfair.50
With Judge Easterbrook, Mr. Lawson concludes that unless
one can argue that it requires no skill or diligence to become a
corporate insider or to acquire enough funds to purchase infor-
mation, the distinction Professor Brudney offers is not particu-
larly promising.51 This is a good application of Judge
Easterbrook's point, and once again, Mr. Lawson deserves
credit for his invocation of this insight. But the argument does
not appear to have anything to do with the concept of egoism.
Rather, like much ofJudge Easterbrook's work, the argument is
couched in a decidedly economic framework. It is based on the
economic notion that society benefits if we provide people with
the incentive to develop the attributes and skills necessary to
become corporate insiders. It has nothing to do with egoism.
c. Insider Trading and Property Rights in Iriformation
The final ethical argument Mr. Lawson identifies as bearing
on the issue of insider trading concerns the subject of property
rights in information. As I have previously observed, the bur-
geoning literature on property rights contains the best reser-
voir of information about the advantages and disadvantages to
society of permitting insider trading in its various forms and
permutations.52
49. Lawson, supra note 1, at 756-57.
50. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 330.
51. Lawson, supra note 1, at 752-58.
52. See Macey, supra note 2.
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Frankly, it is difficult to tell precisely what Mr. Lawson thinks
about the utility of a property rights oriented approach to the
insider trading problem. First Mr. Lawson states that the prop-
osition that "it is morally wrong to trade on information that
does not belong to you . . . is as close to an uncontroversial
moral proposition as one is going to get."53 So far so good. But
next, Mr. Lawson breaks from his earlier analysis by refusing to
concede that it is necessarily morally right for someone to trade
on the basis of information that does belong to him.54 Why
not? From a legal or an economic perspective, the whole point
of assigning somebody a property right in an asset is to permit
that person to put it to use. Usually the best way to use infor-
mation about the future price performance ofa particular stock
is to trade the stock. And the only justifiable reason to forbid
one from using his property in the way he wants is if the use
creates a negative externality by causing a noncompensable
harm to others.55 Mr. Lawson is unwilling, however, even to
concede that property owners have the right to select among
the various noninvasive uses of property rights.56 Because Mr.
Lawson does not elaborate upon this rather surprising remark,
one can only wonder what he has in mind. In what sort of situa-
tion would it be morally wrong for the owner of a bit of infor-
mation to trade on such information in a noninvasive manner?
I can think of none.
Mr. Lawson appears to recognize that the moral inquiry with
respect to insider trading centers on where the web ofcontracts
between the firm and the network of people, including share-
holders, with whom the firm has relationships assigns the right
to trade.57 He ignores, however, that this analysis presumes
that those people who control the property rights to insider in-
formation may alienate it. If they can alienate it (presumably to
somebody who plans to use it), why can they not use it them-
selves without violating any moral principle?
Mr. Lawson's endorsement of the property rights orientation
53. Lawson, supra note 1, at 762.
54. /d. at 753.
55. Often the harm is compensable. When it is, the owner of the asset must gauge
whether this particular use of the asset brings him benefits that outweigh the cost of the
use, including the cost of compensating third parties for the harm he has caused them.
56. "A [classical egoist], at least, while perhaps not wishing to deny a person the
legal right to trade on his information, would hardly say that any noninvasive use he
chooses to make of it is morally right." Lawson, supra note I, at 763.
57. [d. at 764.
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to insider trading is rather half-hearted. He states that the
"problems with the Lockean property rights approach, whether
based on Lockean principles of acquisition or on first posses-
sion, are legion."58 In particular, he is unsure why we do not
"assume that all assets, including all persons and their talents,
skills, and efforts, constitute a common fund."59 Economic the-
ory contains answers to all of Mr. Lawson's questions. For ex-
ample, the well-known tale of the Tragedy of the Commons
explains the problems inherent in communal ownership of
property.60 If every member of a community has unlimited ac-
cess to the resources of the community, then the community's
resources soon will be used up unless they happen to be avail-
able in infinite supply. The system of private ownership of as-
sets, by contrast, effectively can use the price system to ration
the assets in such a way as to preserve them properly and to
benefit all members of the community.61
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF THE ETHICS
Upon close inspection, the moral questions that Mr. Lawson
poses melt into economic questions. As Lloyd Cohen has
pointed out, the economic concepts of efficiency and social
wealth maximization are not only consistent with our moral in-
tuitions, but also with Kant's decidedly altruistic notion that
one should not act in such a way that would be objectionable if
it became a universal practice.62 The point is almost tautologi-
cal. If, somehow, a natural rights analysis assigned the property
interest in a particular asset to a person who was not the high-
est valuing user of that asset, in a world in which exchange is
possible, that person would sell the asset to the person who
valued it more highly. The tough ethical issues lie when one is
called upon to decide how initial entitlements should be dis-
tributed. Once this is done, it is difficult to find an ethical quar-
rel with a system of transferring assets based on mutually
consensual exchange.63
58. /d. at 768.
59.Id.
60. See Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124 (1954).
61. See Agnello & Donnelley, Property Rights and EJjiciency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 521 (1975).
62. Cohen, A justification ofSocial Wealth Maximization as a Rights-Based Ethical Theory,
10 HARv.J.L. PUB. POL'y 411,423 (1987).
63. See Haddock & Macey, supra note 28.
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Thus, it appears to me that Mr. Lawson's article is the intel-
lectual equivalent of a sound and light show at Disneyland. It is
a fun excursion, presenting us with the appearance of actual
motion and adventure, but at the end we are right back at the
point where we started. We are left wondering whether egoism
really has anything much to say about the ethics-as opposed
to the ideology-of insider trading.
Having said this, it is interesting to ponder why a practice
such as insider trading, which appears to involve purely eco-
nomic issues, has become the subject of such a high level of
moral condemnation. There are two possible explanations: one
is socio-biological, and the other is economic.
To the biologist, the "gut-feelings" that comprise the sort of
moral indignation described by Professor Painter64 are, like
other human characteristics, "selected for their capacity to pro-
mote survival and reproduction" thereby leading to the sur-
vival of the species.65 It would not be surprising, therefore, to
discover that humans had evolved in such a way so that feelings
of moral indignation were tied to wealth maximization. If in-
sider trading is like lying or stealing, it would not surprise the
biologist if humans had developed an aversion to it and a way
of involuntarily signalling that aversion to potential trading
partners.66 Such signals are valuable because people will pay a
premium to engage in transactions with those they know to be
trustworthy. In other words, it pays to have a strong sense of
morality, even if such a sense makes us keep commitments in
situations in which immediate material incentives favor break-
ing them.67 To the biologist, that we feel a strong sense of
moral outrage at a particular act often indicates that the act is
not in our long run interests, either individually or as a species.
But the analysis is not so easy. It is clear that lying and steal-
ing are wrong, but it's not clear that insider trading is synony-
mous with these practices. In some cases it may be, but in
others clearly it is not. To the extent that self-interested indi-
viduals and groups can convince the public that all forms of
64. See Painter, supra note 10.
65. This point recently was made in the context of the closely related subject of the
human conscience by Robert Frank. See Frank, If "Homo Economicus" Could Choose His
Own Utility Function, Would He Want One With a Conscience? 77 AM. ECON. REV. 593
(1987).
66. Id. at 595.
67. Id. at 594.
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insider trading should be the subject of moral excoriation,
however, these individuals and groups will find it easier to
achieve their own ends. Thus the alternative explanation to the
self-preservation hypothesis for why insider trading is so widely
condemned is one based on the economic theory of regulation.
If insiders are banned by law from trading there will be trad-
ing profits available to those who are next in line to acquire the
information and assimilate it into a profitable trading strategy.
Putting the matter more succinctly, if true insiders-defined as
corporate officers and directors-are barred from trading,
"those market professionals who devote their careers to acquir-
ing information about a firm, an industry, or a group offirms or
industries and to developing skills for evaluating the informa-
tion they obtain" consistently will be the ones to profit on in-
side information if true insiders are barred from trading.68
Thus, if insider trading is barred, the gains that insiders would
have made will not be randomly dispersed throughout the
economy; rather, market professionals will capture a dispropor-
tionate share of such gains.
These market professionals thus have an incentive to lobby
for legal rules that bar insiders from trading. This sort of lob-
bying is expensive, but to the extent that barring insider trad-
ing can be made to appear to be in the public interest, then
those pressing for passage of rules against insider trading will
find their costs have been reduced.69 Thus, the second hypoth-
esis about why the practice of insider trading has become the
object of moral indignation is that it is in the interest of certain
interest groups to move public opinion in this direction. Be-
cause arguments that insider trading is the same as lying or
stealing have a surface plausibility, and because other interest
groups do not have the ability to counter these arguments
about the ethics of insider trading, it is at least conceivable that
public opinion about insider trading has been shaped by spe-
cial interest groups for political ends.
If this is the case, then obviously the presence of moral indig-
nation at the practice of insider trading should not guide our
judgments regarding the desirability of the practice. Nor
68. Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Mode~ With an Applica-
tion to Insider Trading Regulation, 30J.L. & ECON. 311, 318-19 (1987).
69. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); G. Tullock, Rents, Ignorance and
Ideology 15-16 (1987 manuscript, on file at theJLPP).
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should discussions about the relative merits of altruism and
egoism, since both systems of belief can support arguments for
as well as against insider trading. Rather, notwithstanding Mr.
Lawson's contrary assertions, contractarian-based efficiency ar-
guments hold the most promise for guiding us as to which in-
stances of stock trading are ethical and which are not.
